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CHANGING NOTIONS OF A LANDLORD'S
TORT LIABILITY TO HIS TENANT:
RE-EVALUATING THE CONTROL DOCTRINE
In Sargent v. Ross, plaintiff sought recovery for the death of his
four-year-old daughter who fell from an outdoor stairway leading
exclusively to her baby sitter's second-floor apartment.2  Plaintiff
brought an action for negligence against the baby sitter's landlord,
alleging that the stairs were too steep and that the handrail was
inadequate. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. On appeal
the landlord argued that he owed no duty to the deceased since the
stairway was entirely within the control of the tenant. The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire rejected the landlord's argument, observing
that "the control test is insufficient since it substitutes a facile and
conclusive test for a reasoned consideration of whether due care was
exercised under all the circumstances."3 Recognizing that the anti-
quated common law rules governing landlord liability were greatly
out of touch with modem realities of apartment living, the court
abolished the doctrine of caveat lessee and the general rule of a
landlord's freedom from tort liability. Henceforth, landlords will
be held to the same responsibilities and duties as are ordinary persons
in that they must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to
an unreasonable risk of harm.4
At common law the lessor of land generally owed no duty to the
lessee to repair defective conditions existing on the land at the time
of letting or developing thereafter.5 Likewise, the lessor was not
1. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
2. A landlord owes his tenant's invitee the same duty of care as he owes the
tenant. See Macke Laundry Serv. Co. v. Weber, 267 Md. 426, 429-30, 298
A.2d 27, 29 (1972); Lopez v. Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 365, 137 A.2d 771,
775 (1958); 49 A~x. JUR. 2d Landlord & Tenant §§ 810-11 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Landlord & Tenant].
3. 113 N.H. at ........ , 308 A.2d at 531.
4. Id. at ........ , 308 A.2d at 534.
5. Kowinko v. Salecky, 5 Conn. Cir. 657, 661, 260 A.2d 892, 896 (App. Div.
1969); Lopez v. Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 364, 137 A.2d 771, 774 (1958);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 355, 356 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT]. But see text at note 16 infra (concealed latent defect exception).
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liable to the lessee in tort for personal injuries caused by such
defective conditions. The tenant took the premises as he found
them.6
Historically, the landlord's freedom from responsibility is easily
explained by his dominance in almost all phases of medieval English
society.7 While the feudal landlord usually possessed great wealth,
power and influence, the tenant was commonly a menial servant with
limited choice in selecting his home. Furthermore, many common
law judges were themselves landlords. As a result, the landlord's
duty was limited to surrendering possession to the tenant, in return
for which the tenant covenanted to pay rent.8 The system did have
certain advantages for the tenant, who, in an agrarian society, was
interested primarily in the exclusive use and peaceful enjoyment
of the land, rather than the structures upon it.o The tenant was
content to be free from inspections and other forms of landlord
interference. Accordingly, common law courts accommodated both
parties by treating the lease as a sale of the demised premises for a
term of years., The tenant was thus provided with standing and
remedies to protect his interest against both the landlord and third-
party wrongdoers.12 An additional result, however, was to impose
6. City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 205 (Alas. 1962); Manns v.
Stein, 99 Ill. App. 2d 398, 402, 241 N.E.2d 691, 693 (1968); Burelle v.
Pienkofski, 84 N.H. 200, 148 A. 24 (1929); Yaeger v. Parkgate Realty Co., 88
Ohio L. Abs. 385, 387, 179 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ct. App. 1962); Lopez v.
Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 364, 137 A.2d 771, 775 (1958).
7. See generally Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord (pts. 1-3), 26 Micu.
L. Rrv. 260, 383, 531, at 260-61 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Harkrider]; Note,
Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62
HARv. L. Rat. 669 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Lessor's Duty to Repair].
8. See generally Lipsitz v. Schechter, 377 Mich. 685, 687, 142 N.W.2d 1, 2
(1966); Harkrider, supra note 7, at 261; Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Land-
lord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future,
38 FoRDHAM L. Rav. 225, 227-28 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Quinn & Phillips].
9. Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kline v. Burns,
Ill N.H. 87, 90-91, 276 A.2d 248, 250-51 (1971); Harkrider, supra note 7, at
260-61; Quinn & Phillips, supra note 8, at 227-28, 231.
10. See generally Quinn & Phillips, supra note 8, at 228.
11. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 429, 462 P.2d 470, 472 (1969); Lipsitz
v. Schechter, 377 Mich. 685, 687, 142 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1966); Kline v. Burns, 111
N.H. 87, 90, 276 A.2d 248, 250 (1971); Harkrider, supra note 7, at 260-61;
Lessor's Duty to Repair, supra note 7, at 669.
12. Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 90, 276 A.2d 248, 250 (1971); Harkrider,




upon the tenant the duty to inspect and make minor repairs on
the premises,13 and the liability to third persons for injuries caused
by a breach of that duty.1 4
A number of exceptions soon developed to the general rule of
landlord non-liability.'5 A landlord is liable for a tenant's injuries
if, at the time of letting, the landlord had actual knowledge of a
concealed latent defect of which the tenant was not aware, nor
likely to discover in the exercise of reasonable care, and that the
landlord knew, or should have known, involved an unreasonable
risk of bodily harm.1 Furthermore, the landlord may be liable to
the general public when the property is leased for a public use
and the landlord knows, or should know, of a dangerous defect and
has reason to believe that the lessee will not correct it. A landlord
may also be liable if he voluntarily undertakes to repair but does
so negligently, thereby causing injury to the tenant. s The final
13. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.78, at 347 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952);
Harkrider, supra note 7, at 260-61; Lessor's Duty to Repair, supra note 7, at
669-70. In an agrarian society maintenance and repairs were not nearly so
complex and expensive when tenant- had to be jacks-of-all-trades. See Javins
v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U S. 925 (1970); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d 248, 250-51
(1971); 1 AmRIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra, § 3.78, at 347; Quinn & Phillips,
supra note 8, at 231; Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Criminal
Acts of Third Parties: The View from 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, 59 GEo. L.J.
1153, 1156 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Landlord's Duty].
14. Rahn v. Beurskens, 66 III. App. 2d 423, 427, 213 N.E.2d 301, 304 (1966).
15. See generally Masterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 306-07, 179 A.2d
592, 595 (1962); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388,. ....... 308 A.2d 528, 531 (1973);
Lopez v. Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 364-65, 137 A.2d 771, 775 (1958); W.
BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 47 (3d ed. 1965);
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 27.15-.17 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as HARPER & JAMEs]; 2 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 234 (rev. ed. 1973);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 63 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER); Comment, Liability of Landlord and Tenant to Persons In-
jured on Premises, 39 WASH. L. REV. 345, 352-62 (1964).
16. Kowinko v. Salecky, 5 Conn. Cir. 657, 662, 260 A.2d 892, 896 (App.
Div. 1969); Flournoy v. Kuhn, 378 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964);
Lapp v. Rogers, 265 Ore. 586, 588-89, 510 P.2d 551, 552-53 (1973); Lopez v.
Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 364, 137 A.2d 771, 775 (1958); Boyce v. Shankman,
40 Tenn. App. 475, 482, 292 S.W.2d 229, 232 (1953); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 5, at § 358. Note that the owner is held to have constructive knowledge
of latent defects when third-party strangers are involved.
17. Blair v. Berlo Vending Corp., 287 A.2d 696, 697 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972);
Lopez v. Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 364-65, 137 A.2d 771, 775 (1958); PROSSER,
supra note 15, at 403; RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at § 359.
18. Fitzpatrick v. Ford, 372 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Mo. 1963); Flournoy v. Kuhn,
378 S.W.2d 264. 268 (Mo. Ct. Anp. 1964); Hunkins v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co.,
86 N.H. 356, 357, 169 A. 3, 4 (1933); RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at § 362.
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deviation from the general rule is the control or common use excep-
tion whereby liability is based on the assumption that when a land-
lord leases a building to several tenants he is deemed to have retained
control over those passageways, stairways and other areas that are
used in common by the tenants as appurtenant to their respective
leaseholds 9
In Sargent the court totally abolished the doctrine of caveat lessee,
primarily through its attack on the control exception. Previously,
New Hampshire law was in accord with the great majority of Amer-
ican jurisdictions in endorsing the common law rules of landlord.
tenant tort liability,20 particularly with regard to the control doc-
trine.21 The underlying notion of the control exception is that
because common areas belong to all the tenants, in effect they belong
19. See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 205 (Alas. 1962);
DiMare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 297, 373 P.2d 860, 863, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772,
775 (1962); Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 98, 256 A.2d 246, 251-52
(1969); Manns v. Stein, 99 I1. App. 2d 398, 402, 241 N.E.2d 691, 693 (1968) ;
Trimble v. Spears, 182 Kan. 406, 409, 320 P.2d 1029, 1032 (1958); Parson v.
Whitlow, 453 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Ky. 1970); Macke Laundry Serv. Co. v. Weber,
267 Md. 426, 429-31, 298 A.2d 27, 29-30 (1972); Fitzpatrick v. Ford, 372
S.W.2d 844, 849 (Mo. 1963); Dubreuil v. Dubreuil, 107 N.H. 519, 521, 229
A.2d 338, 340 (1967); Yaeger v. Parkgate Realty Co., 88 Ohio L. Abs. 385,
388, 179 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ct. App. 1962); Lopez v. Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359,
365, 137 A.2d 771, 775 (1958); Smith v. Monmaney, 127 Vt. 585, 588, 255
A.2d 674, 676 (1969); Taylor v. Virginia Constr. Corp., 209 Va. 76, 79, 161
S.E.2d 732, 734 (1968); RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at § 360. See generally
Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 468 (1952); Annots., 25 A.L.R.2d 364, 444 (1952).
20. Dubreuil v. Dubreuil, 107 N.H. 519, 522, 229 A.2d 338, 340 (1967).
See also cases cited note 19 supra.
21. Hunkins v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 86 N.H. 356, 357, 169 A. 3, 4-5 (1933);
Rowe v. Ayer & Williams, Inc., 86 N.H. 127, 128-29, 164 A. 761, 762 (1933);
Burelle v. Pienkofski, 84 N.H. 200, 200-01, 148 A. 24 (1929). The classic
statement of the control exception for New Hampshire and most jurisdictions
appears in Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N.H. 415, 135 A. 20 (1926):
It is generally held that, where he (the landlord) retains possession of a
portion of the leased premises for the use in common of different tenants,
a duty is by law imposed upon him to use ordinary care to keep in safe
condition this particular part of the leased premises, and, if he is negligent
in this regard and a personal injury results to a tenant by reason thereof,
he is liable therefor.
Id. at 417, 135 A. at 21. The only variation to this exception is the Massa-
chusetts rule, which only requires landlords to maintain the common areas in
as good and as safe a condition as they were, or appeared to be, at the time of
letting. Finn v. Peters, 340 Mass. 622, 624, 165 N.E.2d 896, 898 (1960);
Banaghan v. Dewey, 340 Mass. 73, 77, 162 N.E.2d 807, 811 (1959). It should
also be noted that several states have expanded the common law duties of the




to none of them. Consequently, the allocation and coordination
of responsibility would be difficult, fluctuating constantly as tenants
came and went. -2 Thus, the common law imposed the duty upon
the landlord as the only one possessing the power and resources to
make the necessary repairs and provide the necessary protection. 23
The landlord is said to invite the use of common areas by the
tenants.
2 4
The landlord's duty to inspect and repair common areas is not,
however, absolute. He is by no means an insurer of his tenants'
safety.2 5 Rather, his duty is to use ordinary care to make common
areas reasonably safe for his tenants.2 6 He is held to the standard
of a reasonably prudent man concerning what he knows, or should
know, in the exercise of ordinary care.27
22. See Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also
Harkrider, supra note 7, at 383, 402.
23. See Lessor's Duty to Repair, supra note 7, at 670; cf. Sargent v. Ross,
113 N.H. 388, ...... , 308 A.2d 528, 532 (1973), in which the court noted that
one problem under the common law arises when the question of control remains
unresolved, allowing the intolerable situation in which neither party is willing
to take the responsibility for the safe maintenance of an area.
24. Bowman v. Goldsmith Bros. Co., 63 Ohio L. Abs. 428, 433, 109 N.E.2d
556, 558 (Ct. App. 1952); Taylor v. Virginia Constr. Corp., 209 Va. 76, 79,
161 S.E.2d 732, 734-35 (1968).
25. Gladden v. Walker & Dunlop, Inc., 168 F.2d 321, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1948);
DiMare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 297-98, 373 P.2d 860, 863, 23 Cal. Rptr.
772, 775 (1962); Mounsey v. Ellard . ....... Mass -......... ......... 297 N.E.2d 43, 53
(1973); Swingler v. Robinson, 321 S.W.2d 29, 30-31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959);
Boyce v. Shankman, 40 Tenn. App. 475, 481-82, 292 S.W.2d 229, 232 (1953);
Schofield v. Kinzell, 29 Utah 2d 427, 430-31, 511 P.2d 149, 151 (1973); Smith
v. Monmaney, 127 Vt. 585, 588, 255 A.2d 674, 676 (1969); Wagman v.
Boccheciampe, 206 Va. 412, 416, 143 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1965).
26. DiMare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 297-98, 373 P.2d 860, 863, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 772, 775 (1962); Kowinko v. Salecky, 5 Conn. Cir. 657, 663-64, 260
A.2d 892, 897 (App. Div. 1969); Trimble v. Spears, 182 Kan. 406, 409-11,
320 P.2d 1029, 1032-34 (1958): McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash.
2d 443, 445, 486 P.2d 1093, 1094-95 (1971). Under this duty, the landlord is
required to make reasonable inspections at reasonable intervals. DiMare v.
Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 297, 373 P.2d 860, 863, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (1962).
Similarly, the landlord is entitled to a reasonable length of time within which
to make repairs. Klein v. United States, 339 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1964);
Morris v. Oney, 217 Cal. App. 2d 864, 870, 32 Cal. Rptr. 88, 91 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963); Schofield v. Kinzell, 29 Utah 2d 427, 430-31, 511 P.2d 149, 151 (1973).
27. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 389 F.2d 556, 558
(2d Cir. 1968); Trimble v. Spears, 182 Kan. 406, 410, 320 P.2d 1029, 1032
(1958): Lipsitz v. Schechter, 377 Mich. 685, 689, 142 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1966);
Peterson v. Brune, 273 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Mo. 1954); Lopez v. Gukenback,
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There are a number of conditions precedent to a landlord's duty
to maintain common areas in good repair. The basic inquiry is
whether the landlord has retained control. This answer turns on
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding a given case,
with the inquiry focusing on whether the landlord intended to
retain control.2s Generally, a landlord is presumed to have retained
control over common areas.29 Conversely, when a tenant seeks to
show that a landlord retained control over an area leased exclusively
to the tenant, e.g., the tenant's apartment, the presumption is
reversed. 0 The mere right to inspect a tenant's apartment, unac-
companied by a contractual duty to repair, is generally insufficient
to establish that the landlord retained control. 31
Even if the landlord's control over an area is established, his duty
may be limited by a number of exceptions. A landlord is not
required to correct or warn of dangerous conditions that are natural
and obvious, and he incurs no liability for injuries resulting therefrom.3 2
391 Pa. 359, 365, 137 A.2d 771, 775 (1958). See generally HARPER & Jaes,
supra note 15, § 27.17 noting that the duty owed by the landlord is a full, non-
delegable duty of due care and that this duty is not satisfied by warning or making
the danger obvious.
28. Dinnan v. Jozwiakowski, 156 Conn. 432, 434, 242 A.2d 747, 748 (1968);
Lipsitz v. Schechter, 377 Mich. 685, 687, 142 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1966); Lcmm v.
Gould, 425 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Mo. 1968).
29. Mackey v. Allen, 396 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Ky. 1965).
30. Kowinko v. Salecky, 5 Conn. Cir. 657, 663, 260 A.2d 892, 897 (App.
Div. 1969).
31. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 389 F.2d 556, 558
(2d Cir. 1968); Blair v. Berlo Vending Corp., 287 A.2d 696, 697 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1972); Maxwell Bros. v. Deupree Co., 129 Ga. App. 254, 256-57, 199 S.E.2d
403, 405 (1973); cf. Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 98, 256 A.2d 246,
252 (1969); Lemm v. Gould, 425 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Mo. 1968).
32. Compare Harkrider, supra note 7, at 403 with Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H.
388 . ........ , 308 A.2d 528, 532 (1973), and HARPER & JAMES, supra note 15, §§
27.15-.17.
The "ice and snow" cases, for example, hold that a landlord is not liable
for injuries resulting from natural accumulations of ice and snow in common
areas. See Klein v. United States, 339 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1964); Comment,
Liability of Landlord and Tenant to Persons Injured on Premises, supra note
15, at 362-63. Note, however, that liability may be imposed when accumulations
are due to artificial conditions within the control of the landlord. Id. But see
Schofield v. Kinzell, 29 Utah 2d 427, 430-31, 511 P.2d 149, 151 (1973) (duty
to remove); HARPER & JAmEs, supra note 15, § 27.17 (only a minority of states
do not require removal).
Similarly, a landlord ordinarily is not held liable for injuries caused by dark-
ness from failure to light common hallways and stairways. Ullrich v. Kintzele,




A further limitation provides that if a tenant is injured while using
a common area in a manner for which it is not reasonably intended,
the landlord incurs no liability.3 3 Traditional negligence doctrines
may also assist landlords to escape liability to an injured tenant.3 4
Courts will weigh evidence of the landlord's negligence35 against
such factors as the tenant's contributory negligence,3 6 assumption of
the risk, 7 proximate cause,38 and foreseeabilityo in deciding the
landlord's liability.
Judicial application of the control doctrine has not been uniform.
Courts have varied their approach when determining how strictly
the concept should be interpreted. The result has been a wide range
of decisions reflecting varying views of equity. By manipulating the
facts of a given case, courts have used the control concept to achieve
what in their view was the appropriate result.40
two exceptions: if the common passageways or stairways are inherently dangerous,
or if the landlord has voluntarily assumed the duty of lighting, he is bound to
follow through with reasonable care. Tremblay v. Donnelly, 103 N.H. 498, 500-01,
175 A.2d 391, 393 (1961). See also HARPER &- JAMES, supra note 15, § 27.17;
Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 496 (1952).
33. Trimble v. Spears, 182 Kan. 406, 413-15, 320 P.2d 1029, 1035-37 (1958);
Landay v. Cohn, 220 Md. 24, 28, 150 A.2d 739, 741 (1959); Wagman v.
Boccheciampe, 206 Va. 412, 416, 143 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1965); Landlord &
Tenant, supra note 2, at 764. Cf. text at note 24 supra. But see Freeman v. Maz-
zera, 150 Cal. App. 2d 61, 63, 309 P.2d 510, 511 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957), which
held that the intended use defense does not apply to small children.
34. Trimble v. Spears, 182 Kan. 406, 412, 320 P.2d 1029, 1034-35 (1958).
35. Id.
36. Id.: Sabin v. C & L Dev. Corp., 141 So. 2d 482, 486 (La. Ct. App. 1962);
Landlord & Tenant, supra note 2, at 778.
37. Landlord & Tenant, supra note 2, at 778.
38. Trimble v. Spears, 182 Kan. 406, 412, 320 P.2d 1029, 1034-35 (1958);
Landlord & Tenant, supra note 2, at 765.
39. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 478
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Sabin v. C & L Dev. Corp., 141 So. 2d 482, 486 (La. Ct.
App. 1962); see, e.g., Martin v. Reis, 344 Mass. 32, 37, 181 N.E.2d 580, 584
(1962). See also note 33 supra; Landlord's Duty, supra note 13.
40. E.g., Torre v. De Renzo, 143 Conn. 302, 122 A.2d 25 (1956); Pratt v.
Scott Enterprises, Inc., 421 Pa. 46, 218 A.2d 795 (1966). In both cases plaintiff
fell through the floor of premises occupied solely by the tenant, into the basement,
which had remained in the control of the landlord. Torre denied recovery on
the ground that the weak floor represented a defect entirely within the tenant's
control. Pratt. on the other hand, allowed recovery on the theory that it was
not the tenant's floor that was defective but rather the landlord's basement ceil-
ing. For a discussion of the common service system cases (i.e. the utilities systems,
such as heating, electrical, water, gas, etc.) see Gladden v. Walker & Dunlop,
1975]
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Holdings favorable to the landlord have been reached through
a strictly mechanical application of the control doctrine. 1 This
approach draws artificial lines regardless of the actual uses to which
an area is put by the tenants. 42 Judicial manipulation of facts on
the landlord's behalf has also occurred in connection with the other
exceptions to non-liability. 3 Such judicial manipulation has en-
couraged some unusual attempts by counsel to insulate the landlord
from liability by perverting the control doctrine.44
On the other hand, courts holding in favor of the tenant have
also demonstrated great judicial imagination. Like their pro-landlord
counterparts, some of these courts have resorted to manipulation of
Inc., 168 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Coleman v. Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 253
A.2d 167 (1969); Green v. Kahn, 391 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. 1965); Thompson v.
Paseo Manor South, Inc., 331 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959), all holding that
such common service systems are deemed to have been retained within the land-
lord's control. Contra, Yuppa v. Whittaker, 88 R.I. 214, 145 A.2d 255 (1958)
(recovery denied on the ground that the particular instrumentality of the harm
-a radiator-was exclusively within the tenant's control). It is worth noting
that the facts of the Yuppa case are identical to those of Thompson.
41. Cf. text at note 3 supra.
42. See, e.g., Bowman v. Goldsmith Bros. Co., 63 Ohio L. Abs. 428, 109
N.E.2d 556 (Ct. App. 1952). Bowman denied recovery holding that when the
first flight of a two-flight stairway served both the first and second floor tenants
it was a common stairway but that the second flight of the same stairway was ex-
clusively in the control of the second story tenant. Cf. text at note 57 infra.
See also Finn v. Peters, 340 Mass. 622, 165 N.E.2d 896 (1960) (recovery denied
to a tenant injured when a porch railing gave way, for even though the porch
was serviced by a common stairway, the porch itself was not "reasonably incident"
to the common throughway); Foster v. Laba, 402 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App.
1966) (different landlords, each owning separate halves of a building, were said
to give each of two tenants sharing the same floor exclusive possession of a half-
interest in what would otherwise have been a common porch, thus precluding a
finding that a given landlord had retained control).
43. See, e.g., Coates v. Dewoskin, 379 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964), in
which a hole in an apartment bedroom ceiling had merely been covered over
with wallpaper prior to plaintiff's tenancy. When the remaining plaster fell on
plaintiff, the court refused to recognize this as within the concealed latent defect
exception, reasoning that holes do not fall and that it could not say for a fact
that the missing plaster so weakened the rest of the ceiling as to be a cause-
i.e. no defect existed to be concealed. Id. at 148-49.
44. Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941) (plaintiff did not
retain exclusive control of the hallways just because he was the sole tenant in
the building); Weidner v. Schottenstein, 111 Ohio App. 376, 169 N.E.2d 304
(1960) (merely because plaintiff was injured when she stepped on the lid of a
garbage can assigned exclusively to a fellow tenant did not mean that she had




facts to reach the result they find most equitable.45 An additional
tactic employed by some courts is to estop the landlord from denying
control when, by his silence or conduct, he is deemed to have
acquiesced in the common use of an area.46
A growing minority of progressive and enlightened courts, aware
of the landlord's superior bargaining power and the increasing
dependence of the modem tenant upon the landlord for complex and
costly services that are beyond the tenant's power to provide, have taken
more direct action on behalf of the tenant, avoiding the subterfuges
and manipulations of other courts.47 These courts have not hesitated
to re-evaluate common law rules governing the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship when the underlying rationales are no longer appropriate.4s
The majority of tenants are no longer self-sufficient farmers primarily
interested in the land,49 but urbanites whose major concerns are
proper dwelling maintenance and provision of necessary services by
the landlord.50 The modem tenant is faced with repairs that require
more skill and financial outlay than those contemplated when land-
45. See, e.g., Fantacone v. McQueen, 196 Cal. App. 2d 477, 16 Cal. Rptr.
630 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Pratt v. Scott Enterprises, Inc., 421 Pa. 46, 218
A.2d 795 (1966) (discussed in note 40 supra).
46. See, e.g., Sonne v. Booker, 310 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1957); Rowe v. Ayer
& Williams, Inc., 86 N.H. 127, 164 A. 761 (1933). In both cases the land-
lord was deemed to have acquiesced to the use of a fire escape as a common
passageway by his failure to object. But see Swingler v. Robinson, 321 S.W.2d
29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
47. See, e.g., Jauins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077, 1079
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87,
91-92, 276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971). Much of the landlord's leverage comes from
the housing shortage created by the rapid urbanization of this country, especially
since World War II. See Lessor's Duty to Repair, supra note 7, at 671.
48. See, e.g., Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Mounsey v. Ellard . ....... Mass ........ . ........ 297 N.E.2d
43, 51 (1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d 248, 250-51 (1971);
Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 27, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (1973); cf. Mc-
Cutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 449-50, 486 P.2d 1093,
1097 (1971). See generally Lessor's Duty to Repair, supra note 7, at 671.
49. Cf. Javins v. First Nat'1 Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
50. Id.; Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 430, 462 P.2d 470, 473 (1969);
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d 248, 250-51 (1971); Landlord's
Duty, supra note 13, at 1156.
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lord-tenant law was developing.51 In addition, the modern tenant's
vastly greater mobility discourages substantial investments of time
and money in the leasehold. 52
Growing awareness of modem landlord-tenant problems has led
some courts to expand the landlord's duties and obligations to his
tenant 53 Among the boldest extensions of the landlord's duty is a
recent line of cases holding that a landlord has a duty to protect
his tenants from foreseeable criminal assaults in common areas.5 4
The reasoning in these cases illustrates the growing judicial aware-
ness of the realities of modem urban apartment living.
It should be noted, however, that many of these recent develop-
ments in the law have been effectuated by courts operating within
51. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 91, 276 A.2d
248, 250-51 (1971); Lessor's Duty to Repair, supra note 7, at 671. See also
note 13 supra.
52. See note 51 supra.
53. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Saint Raymond's Roman Catholic Church, 21
N.Y.2d 554, 236 N.E.2d 632, 289 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1968), in which the court
held that the common law rule of no duty to light the common areas was an
anachronism not in accord with the technology or mores of modem society and
therefore abolished the exception. Id. at 558, 236 N.E.2d at 634, 289 N.Y.S.2d
at 403. Similarly, the court in McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash.
2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093 (1971), held that exculpatory clauses in leases were
contrary to public policy and would not be enforced. Id. at 450, 486 P.2d at
1097. Still more recently, some courts have begun to recognize that the lesser
duty of care owed by a landlord to a licensee, as opposed to an invitee, is an
archaic distinction based on a rationale that is no longer justifiable in light of
the hazards of everyday urban living. See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant,
Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mounsey v. Ellard, ........ Mass .........
........ , 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (1973). See also Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104
(D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the court refused to consider the control issue as
dispositive, observing that it was anachronistic when applied in the modem urban
apartment context. Note, however, that the court did not do away with the control
doctrine, as did the court in Sargent, but merely found it inappropriate because of
the unusual tenancy involved. In Clarke the landlord allowed a group of working
women to share an apartment under an arrangement that allowed any one of them
to move out whenever she wished, as long as she found a replacement. The court
reasoned that such a fluctuating situation never permitted a given group of
tenants to retain control or to allocate responsibility efficiently (cf. text at note
22 supra), hence the landlord was deemed to have retained control. 435 F.2d
at 112.
54. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d
477 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409
(1972). See also Landlord's Duty, supra note 13; Comment, Protection of
Tenants: The Extent of the Landlord's Duty, 1971 L. & Soc. OaDER 612; 7




the traditional confines of landlord-tenant law. The scope of the
landlord's duty is often still limited by the extent of his control."
It is in this respect that Sargent represents a clean break from the
past. Unlike former decisions, Sargent does not extend the landlord's
tort liability merely by expanding the exceptions to the general rule
of non-liability.56 Instead, Sargent marks the first time that a court
has imposed directly upon the landlord the same responsibilities and
liabilities to which other individuals are subject.
In reaching its result, the court reasoned that "[a] proper rule
of law would not preclude recovery in such a case by a person fore-
seeably injured by a dangerous hazard solely because the stairs
serviced one apartment instead of two."5  The opinion noted that
such a mechanical determination of duty and liability may have
been justifiable in medieval England, but that such a system finds
no supportable rationale for its continued existence today.5 8 Rather
55. See, e.g., text at note 54 supra.
56, The only other comparable innovation occurred in those cases holding
that a landlord is under an implied warranty to furnish a dwelling fit for human
habitation. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d
470 (1969); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Foisy v.
Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d
590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). A breach of such an implied warranty of habit-
ability would generally give rise to an action in contract rather than in tort.
It should be noted that a warranty action does not require a personal injury,
only that the object of the contract-the leasehold--does not accord with com-
monly accepted standards of fitness and livability. In this respect, the type of injuries
for which the action would lie may well be different and more varied than those
recoverable under a tort theory. New Jersey, for example, allows recovery for
economic injury stemming from defective products (including housing) under
a theory of strict liability in tort as well as contractual warranty. See Santor
v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). In California,
on the other hand, recovery for economic losses because of defective products is
restricted to contractual warranty theories, expressly rejecting strict liability in
tort as a theory of recovery when commercial losses are concerned. See Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). Like-
wise, the remedies available in a warranty action may be of a different scope
and nature (e.g., rent reduction or the cost of repairing and making fit). See
Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 93-94, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971). See also
PaosszR, supra note 15, at 408-09, 640.
57. 113 N.H. at ........ , 308 A.2d at 531.
58. Id. at ........, 308 A.2d at 533, 534-35. See also Mounsey v. Ellard, ........
Mass ......... ......... 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (1973) ; text at note 3 supra; text at notes
47-52 supra.
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than engraft yet another artificial exception onto the rule of landlord
liability, the court preferred to discard the old rationale in favor
of a more realistic approach. 9 Such a change, the court noted, would
not require the landlord to make any difficult adjustments since he
would merely be governed by traditional negligence standards already
applicable to him when acting as an individual.60 The court observed
that henceforth the court will not ask "who had control" but whether
due care was exercised by all parties.0 In conclusion, the court stated:
The questions of control, hidden defects and common or public
use, which formerly had to be established as a prerequisite to
even considering the negligence of a landlord, will now be rele-
vant only inasmuch as they bear on the basic tort issues such
as the foreseeability and unreasonableness of the particular risk
of harm.62
It might be argued that Sargent's practical effect will not be as
great as its radical implications portend. Unless the tenant willingly
relinquishes his privacy to allow landlord inspections at will,3 it
may be unreasonable to subject the landlord to liability,4 a result
much the same as under the control doctrine. Nevertheless, Sargent
will lead to a different outcome in at least two situations in which
the landlord previously would have been insulated from liability:
when he had actual notice of the defect but did not attempt to
repair;65 and when the landlord could readily inspect and repair
59. 113 N.H. at ........, 308 A.2d at 533. See also Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970)
(noting the disadvantages of piecemeal reform).
60. 113 N.H. at ......... 308 A.2d at 534.
61. Id. at ........ 308 A.2d at 535.
62. Id. at ........, 308 A.2d at 534.
63. Cf. text at note 10 supra.
64. Cf. Lessor's Duty to Repair, supra note 7, at 676. See also 51C CJ .S.
Landlord & Tenant § 371, at 978 (1968), which states: "Where a landlord is
obligated to make repairs during the term, actual or constructive notice of the
need for repair is necessary to put him in default on his obligation, unless
he . . .has actual knowledge, or reasonable opportunity to acquire knowledge,
of the defect." (Emphasis added.)
65. E.g., Green v. Del-Camp Inv., Inc., 193 Cal. App. 2d 479, 14 Cal, Rptr.
420 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Coates v. Dewoskin, 379 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App.




an area that, although technically within the tenant's control, was
not within the realm of his personal privacy.6 6
Whether Sargent will be a landmark case in the law of landlord
tort liability remains to be seen. It is unknown how the Sargent
rationale will be received by other jurisdictions.6 7 Although courts
that have previously demonstrated their awareness of urban realities8
will probably approve of Sargent, those in larger, more urbanized
states may still hesitate to follow it because of the economic implica-
tions. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that Sargent represents an
unequivocal break with the common law past.
Stuart J. Radloff
66. Such was the factual situation in Sargent. See, e.g., Harris v. Ellis Realty,
Inc., 350 Mass. 520, 215 N.E.2d 797 (1966); Fitzpatrick v. Ford, 372 S.W.2d
844 (Mo. 1963); Flournoy v. Kuhn, 378 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964);
cases cited note 42 supra.
67. A preliminary indication may be found in a recent California intermediate
appellate decision that endorsed Sargent and the trend towards applying ordinary
rules of negligence to the law of real property. Brennan v. Cockrell Invs.
Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (Ct. App. 1973).
68. See cases cited notes 47-51 supra.
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